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BERLIN TALKS: The chief Soviet adviser at the Berlin talks has expressed a desire to conclude discussion at the advisers' level and to reach final four-power agreement by mid-August.

Soviet adviser Kvitsinsky made these suggestions at the meeting on 28 July. Dramatic Soviet calls for a quick wrap-up of the talks are nothing new, but this is the first time they have proposed ending discussion at the advisers' level and moving the venue to the ambassadors' level.

In recent weeks the frequency of meetings has increased markedly, but there has been growing doubt among the Western governments that progress has kept pace. Kvitsinsky's proposal to move the negotiations into a new phase may be a tactic to increase the pressure on the Allies. The Soviets are undoubtedly aware that some high West German officials have expressed the fear that unless a four-power Berlin agreement is reached this year, the related ratification of the Soviet - West German Treaty will become fatally entangled in the 1973 West German election campaign.

A proposal by Kvitsinsky on one of the substantive issues in the talks also seems aimed at expediting conclusion of the four-power stage of the negotiations. He outlined a new procedural approach to the question of a Federal German presence in West Berlin which would replace the controversial list of permissible activities with a general statement, to be supplemented by an Allied memorandum setting Kvitsinsky's proposal may signal yet forth details. another Soviet effort to transfer this topic to the The Allied advistalks between the two Germanies. ers reserved judgment on this idea pending further consultation and exploration, but their initial reaction was that it offered little substantive improvement. At the same time, Kvitsinsky attempted to reintroduce objectionable wording on the subject of West German access to Berlin.

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Kvitsinsky's remark that the fruitfulness of further meetings at the advisers' level is at an end has some basis in fact. The advisers have now discussed all sections of the proposed agreement in great detail and have produced tentative drafts on all sections. While the negotiations have been businesslike and unpolemical, significant areas of disagreement remain throughout. Last week Kvitsinsky informed his French counterparts that all instructions to the Soviet delegation came from Gromyko himself. Further movement in the talks thus may require negotiators at a higher level. Today's ambassadorial session could well provide a clearer indication of the future direction of the talks.

EURATOM: Concessions to France appear to have broken the long stalemate in EURATOM which has prevented its five non-nuclear members from moving toward ratification of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT).

Since the NPT was completed in 1968, these five and France have been sharply at odds on how the community should comply with the treaty's safeguard provisions. Paris, which has no intention of adhering to the treaty, has held that verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—which the NPT calls for—would violate the EURATOM treaty. However, in blocking the opening of negotiations between the two organizations, France has in fact been bargaining for an exemption from EURATOM's own safeguards that have been long resented by nationalistic elements in the Pompidou government.

The "compromise" apparently reached among the Six in Brussels last week appears to have given Paris much of what it wanted. With few exceptions—notably the fissile materials it receives from the US—France will be able to decide for itself which of its nuclear undertakings are "peaceful" and therefore subject to EURATOM's safeguards. Although the other members may ask the EC Council to "examine" complaints that specific exemptions give the French commercial advantage, it is doubtful that this can be an effective constraint. In addition, France has not committed itself to follow the US and UK lead in offering voluntarily to accept IAEA inspection of certain peaceful installations.

France's special position may eventually cause difficulties with some of the other EURATOM countries, particularly West Germany, but the agreement should permit EURATOM to open negotiations with the IAEA in the fall. The five signatories of the NPT have felt under increasing pressure to do so, especially from the Soviet Union, which has been threatening to raise the issue at the IAEA general conference in September if the impasse is not resolved by then.

SUDAN-USSR: The reported departure of several Soviet experts from the Sudan is probably the result of Sudanese rather than Soviet action.

Sudanese President Numayri announced yesterday that Soviet experts in his country had nearly completed their mission and were about to leave. He stated that seven Soviets had left the Sudan prior to the recent coup. Numayri said that he had no evidence of Soviet involvement in the coup attempt and had no desire to see a deterioration in relations with Moscow. However, none of the military or economic projects undertaken by the Soviets in the Sudan would appear to be near enough to completion to warrant the departure of the experts.

There are estimated to be at least 500 Soviet experts in the Sudan.

Moscow is vigorously protesting the execution of the Sudanese Communists. An authoritative Izvestiya article yesterday bitterly condemned the "mass terror" against the Communists, despite "numerous calls from Soviet leaders" to refrain from "extraordinary measures." The tone of the article suggests that the Soviets will take some concrete steps to demonstrate their dissatisfaction. The Soviets have a history of sacrificing local Communist parties when it is in the USSR's national interest, however, and they would be unlikely to abandon completely their investment in the Sudan because of the execution of local party members.

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ETHIOPIA: Emperor Haile Selassie has accepted an invitation to visit Communist China this fall, probably in late October.

The two countries established diplomatic relations last December. The Emperor probably will announce the establishment of an embassy in Peking during the trip, although financial considerations may delay the formal opening of a mission.

Addis Ababa apparently expects Peking to be forthcoming with economic assistance as a result of the visit.

An Ethiopian trade and aid delegation, originally scheduled to go to Peking in October, is instead going in September to work out details of an economic agreement that can then be signed by the Emperor the following month.

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